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The problem of designing tournament contracts under limited liability and
alternative performance measures is considered. Under risk neutrality, only the
best performing agent receives an extra premium if the liability constraint be-
comes binding. Under risk aversion, more than one prize is awarded. In both
situations, performance measures can be ranked if their likelihood ratio distri-
bution functions differ by a mean preserving spread. The latter result is applied
to questions of contest design and more general forms of relative performance
payment.
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11 Introduction
Tournaments and contests are widely used for compensation and incentive purposes.
To this end, planners apply a variety of performance indicators. In some cases, the
performance measure is identical to the organizer’s objective, in others, there seems
to be only an indirect relation to what is sought to be procured by the tournament. In
all cases, however, the incentive effects of potential performance measures are at least
implicitly taken into account.
Fromaneconomicperspective, incentiveeffectsofperformancemeasurementhave
been extensively discussed within a standard agency framework. Starting with the pi-
oneering work of Holmström [11], numerous papers have analyzed questions of infor-
mation efﬁciency under the assumption of optimal contracts in a moral hazard setting.
In doing so, they established several criteria for ranking alternative information sys-
tems (see, for example, Gjesdal [6], Holmström [12], Grossman and Hart [9], Amershi
and Hughes [1], Kim [13], or Demougin and Fluet [5]).
Only little work, however, has so far been done on information efﬁciency in a tour-
nament setting where contracts are exogenously restricted to the order of the agents’
performance. Under such a restriction, the criteria derived in the standard setting are
not naturally valid. As Holmström ([11], p. 86) states, "if, for administrative reasons,
one has restricted attention a priori to a limited class of contracts (e.g., linear price
functions or instruction-like step functions), then informativeness may not be sufﬁ-
cient for improvements within this class". In general, the same objection applies to the
other criteria. Due to the widespread use of tournaments, it is therefore worthwhile
reasoning whether the criteria derived in the standard agency setting also apply under
the speciﬁc restrictions given by a tournament contract.
The classical agency literature discusses the use of information in tournaments
mainly with regard to optimal contracts. Adapting his sufﬁcient statistics results de-
2rived from the standard agency setting, Holmström ([12], proposition 7) proves that
relative performance evaluation will be valuable if and only if the agent’s outputs are
stochastically dependent. Similarly, Green and Stokey ([8], proposition 1) show in
a more speciﬁc setting that individual contracts dominate tournaments whenever the
agents’ outputs admit only idiosyncratic risk. Conversely, if there is common uncer-
tainty, tournaments will dominate individual contracts when the common shock be-
comes diffuse (ibid., proposition 2). Mookherjee ([20], proposition 4) applies Holm-
ström’s [11] informativeness result to show that a tournament contract will be optimal
if an agent’s rank in output is statistically sufﬁcient for all available information with
respect to his action choice.
In all of these results, informativeness criteria are applied to distinguish between
different types of contracts. We shall return to this important question when applying
our general results. At ﬁrst, however, we look for criteria to rank information systems
in a setting where contracts are exogenously restricted to rank orders. To distinguish
the analysis from the previous research on optimal contracts, we deliberately conﬁne
ourselves to analyzing situations where the agents’ performances are stochastically
independent. According to Holmström’s [12] result mentioned above, a tournament
contract will not be optimal in this setting, and an application of the general infor-
mativeness results will thus not be valid. We show that nonetheless, the main criteria
also apply to the tournament setting. Thereafter, we use these criteria to distinguish
between different types of relative performance evaluation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the analytical
framework is presented. Section 3 describes the main characteristics of an information
system with respect to the principal’s optimization problem. Sections 4 and 5 present
information efﬁciency results and some application to the comparison of alternative
contract types. Concluding remarks are given in section 6.
32 Model
Consider a single-period agency setting in which a risk-neutral principal hires a num-
berof agents i=1,...,n (n≥2)to perform identical tasks. The agents who decide to
participate provide a productive input ai ∈A=[a,a]⊂R not observed by the principal.
The resulting outputs xi ∈ X ⊆ R which accrue to the principal are independent iden-
tically distributed random variables. Their probability distribution function F(xi;ai)
is parameterized by the agent’s action choice. Increases in ai are assumed to shift the
distribution function to the right in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Thus,
ceteris paribus the principal will prefer higher effort levels.
All agents have identical preferences. These can be described by utility functions
which are additively separable in monetary income wi and effort ai, such as
Ui(wi,ai) = u(wi)−d(ai),
where u(wi) denotes the agent’s utility on monetary income and d(ai) denotes the
agent’s disutility of action ai. We assume that the agents are effort-averse and weakly
risk-averse1, i.e. u0 > 0,u00 ≤ 0, d0 > 0 and d00 > 0.
Before hiring the agents, the principal chooses an information system k from a set







after the action choices have been taken. The signals k
i are independent identically dis-
tributed random variables with distribution function Gk(yk
i;ai) and probability density
function gk(yk
i;ai) which depend on the respective agent’s effort. The latter is assumed
to be twice differentiable in ai, and its support is independent of ai. Signal yk
i can
be regarded as a performance measure for agent i. In the simplest case, performance
is measured by output (yi = xi). More generally, yk
i may be an index of all available
information on the agent’s action. We assume that higher effort can be inferred from
1Results are presented separately for risk-neutral and strictly risk averse agents.
4a higher performance score, i.e. the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) is
assumed to hold for any information service k.
Given the information system, the principal designs an ordinal payment scheme
which determines agent i’s compensation according to his rank ri in the order of the
observed signals. Let wj denote the compensation stipulated for the jth-lowest rank
j within the order of performance measures. In the case of multiple ranking agents
the respective prize is awarded via randomization2. Under these assumptions, agent i’s








ij(a) = Prob{ri = j | (a1,...,an)} denotes the probability that agent i will
achieve rank j in the tournament 3.
The principal wants all agents to participate. Hence, their expected utilities have
to reach a certain reservation level UR which is assumed to be identical for all agents.
Furthermore, we assume that agents are of restricted wealth, and thus compensation
has to exceed a liability level wmin for each agent.
3 The principal’s problem and properties of informa-
tion systems
The principal seeks to maximize his expected proﬁt net of wage payments. His prob-
lem is to select compensations w = (w1,...,wn) from a set W n ⊂ Rn of feasible com-
pensations such that the agents choose actions ˆ ai which maximize his expected net
proﬁt.
2However, this will occur with zero probability because the density functions gk have no mass points.
3According to this diction, rank n denotes the highest outcome.
5Due to the principal’s risk neutrality, this problem can be split up, ﬁrst considering
the least cost way of achieving a given action proﬁle and then turning to the question
of which actions to implement. To our purpose of comparing performance measures,
the interesting part is the ﬁrst. Therefore, similar to Kim’s [13] analysis of the stan-
dard agency model, we will focus on the question of what type of information system
k implements a particular effort proﬁle a at the lowest cost. In doing so, we restrict
the analysis to symmetric Nash equilibria of the tournament game. Consequently, all
agents choose the same action ˆ a, and each agent’s probability of winning is 1/n. The
principal’s cost minimization problem for the symmetric equilibrium given informa-













u(wj)−d(ˆ a) ≥UR (2)










wj ≥ wmin ∀j. (4)
The participation constraints (2) guarantee that all agents accept the contract. The
Nash - incentive constraints (3) ensure that given his opponents equilibrium strategies
ˆ a−i, the desired action ai is in agent i’s own best interest.




in) of ranking probabilities. In order to compare information systems
with regard to their cost of inducing a certain action a, we are interested in properties










j:n(y; ˆ a)dy, (5)
4See Green and Stokey [8], p. 355.
6where gk
j:n(y;a) denotes the density of the (j : n)-order statistic under distribution Gk.
For ai = ˆ a, the integral in (5) is 1, and pk
ij = 1/n. Differing from ˆ a, the agent varies his
ranking probabilities. The way in which these changes work at ˆ a mainly determines
the incentive effects of information system k. Similar to the standard agency setting,
further insight into the quality of a performance measure can be gained under the ﬁrst-
order approach. As in the standard model, it is valid under the additional assumption
thatGk(yk;ai)isconvexina(convexityofthedistributionfunctioncondition, CDFC)5.








ij(ˆ a)−d0(ˆ a) = 0 (6)













j:n(y; ˆ a)dy. (7)
The integral in (7) is the expected value of the score function
ga
g for the (j : n) -
order statistic of performance scores. By MLRP, this function, which for simplicity
is often referred to as the likelihood ratio, is increasing in yk. Therefore, the agents’












= d0(ˆ a), (8)
where lr
k,ˆ a
j:n denotes the (j : n) - order statistic of likelihood ratios derived from gk at











= 0 by the assumption of non-moving
supports6. Therefore, the incentive effects of some prizes w1,...,wl(l < n) will be
negative, whereas those of the remaining ones will be positive.
In the following sections, we will exploit further properties of moments and distri-
butions of order statistics in order to compare different information services. Section
5A proof is available from the author upon request.
6For the relation of order statistics, see Arnold et al. 1992, p. 110.
74 derives results for the risk neutral agency, and section 5 presents the ﬁndings for
risk-averse agents. Both sections contain applications to questions of contest design
and more general forms of relative performance payment.
4 risk neutral agents
4.1 Optimal reward structure


























wj ≥ wmin ∀j. (12)
Similar to Lazear’s and Rosen’s [15] analysis of a tournament with two agents,
the ﬁrst-best solution can be achieved under any informative performance measure
as long as the liability constraints (12) are not binding. Starting from equal prizes
for all ranks, the principal just has to increase the prize differentials wj −wj−1 for






until the Nash incentive constraints
(11) are fulﬁlled. By adjustment of w1, the participation constraint can be fulﬁlled
with equality. Implementation is without additional cost because of the agent’s risk




Under limited liability, however, this procedure, in general, will not be feasible.






, the liability constraints will become binding in the
optimal solution. As a consequence, it will matter to which ranks the prize differentials
are allocated. Due to the agents’ risk neutrality, however, the optimal prize structure is
8apparently simple:
Proposition 1 If the agents’ liability constraint is binding under information system
k, the cost-minimizing tournament only awards a prize to the best performing agent.
Proof The proof is in the appendix.
Essentially, theproofofproposition1showsthatcompensationcostcanbelowered
by shifting compensation from lower ranks to the the highest rank of the tournament.
The economics of the result are similar to those in the standard agency setting as de-
rived by Demougin and Fluet [4]. If the agents are risk neutral, income smoothing
only matters with regard to the minimum wage. Incentives, however, are least costly
provided by rewarding only those results the probability of which reacts most sensitive
to changes in the agent’s effort. In the contest setting, due to the MLRP this is the top
rank rn:n.
The proposition also complies with results of Moldovanu and Sela [18] who ﬁnd
that in a symmetric equilibrium of privately informed contestants, a total premium is
most effectively allocated to only the winner of the contest7. Similar to the moral
hazard setting analyzed here, the result is driven by the fact that a single prize pro-
vides the strongest incentives for risk neutral contestants. However, since under pri-
vate pre-decision information different types of agents choose different effort levels in
equilibrium, Moldovanu’s and Sela’s result requires linear or concave cost functions
for which variations in effort have no cost increasing effects. In the present setting,
convexity of the cost function is not an issue since all agents choose identical actions.
7The same result is derived by Glazer and Hassin [7] in a related framework, but under more restric-
tive assumptions.
94.2 Information efﬁciency
Given the structure of the optimal contract, a comparison of alternative information
systems is straightforward. Whenever the agents’ liability constraints are binding, the
optimal reward scheme takes the form w=(wmin,...,wmin,wn). In this scheme, wn has





n:n] = d0(ˆ a). (13)







As a consequence, the total compensation cost under information system k in a
symmetric equilibrium of n contestants with action choices ˆ a can be written as
Ck













Proposition 2 In the symmetric equilibrium ˆ a of the tournament under information
system k, total compensation cost is the lower, the higher E[lr
k,ˆ a
n:n].
Proof Obvious from (14). Ck
n is decreasing in E[lr
k,a
n:n]. 2
Given the prominent role of the likelihood ratio in (14), proposition 2, when related
to the literature on informativeness criteria, provides a direct reference to Kim’s [13]
criterion of a mean preserving spread of likelihood ratio distribution functions. Kim
[13] proves that in a standard agency setting with one risk-averse agent, an action
ˆ a can be induced under a signal yl at a lower cost than under another signal ym if
the distribution function of the likelihood ratio
gl
a
gl under signal yl differs from that
10under signal ym by a mean preserving spread (MPS)8. Since due to the assumption of a
non-moving support the expected likelihood ratio is zero for all information systems,
the MPS relation reduces to second order stochastic dominance. In order to exploit
this property, Kim essentially shows that the compensation cost is a concave function
of likelihood ratios, the expectation of which is lower under second order stochastic
dominance9. A related convexity argument can be applied here to establish the mean
preserving spread criterion as a device to rank information systems in the tournament
setting:
Proposition 3 In the symmetric equilibrium ˆ a of the tournament, total compensation
cost under information system yl is lower than that under information system ym if the
distribution function of the likelihood ratio lrl,ˆ a =
gl
a(yl;ˆ a)
gl(yl;ˆ a) under signal yl differs from
that under signal ym by a mean preserving spread.
Proof 10 The proof is in the appendix.
The proof of proposition 3 makes use of the fact that the well known consequences
of second order stochastic dominance between univariate distributions extend to the
product distribution of i.i.d. random variables. By the convexity of the maximum
operator, it is thus obvious that a mean preserving spread relation yields a unique order
of highest order statistics. Therefore, like in the standard agency setting, information
systems can be compared by the distributions of their likelihood ratios. Similarly, the
mean preserving spread property only provides a local criterion for a speciﬁc action
ˆ a. To make general predictions for arbitrary levels of a, the relation must hold for all
a ∈ (a,a]. This, again, has been proven by Kim ([13], proposition 4) to follow from
8For the deﬁnitions of a mean preserving spread see Rothschild and Stiglitz [21].
9The result can also be carried forward to a standard agency model with a risk neutral agent who is
of limited wealth.
10A related proof for risk-averse agents can be found in Budde and Gaffke [3].
11the criterion of Blackwell informativeness (the opposite is not true). From this, the
following conclusion is obvious:
Corrollary 1 In any symmetric equilibrium of the tournament, total compensation
cost under information system yl is lower than that under information system ym if yl
is Blackwell sufﬁcient for ym with respect to a.
Proof The claim follows from proposition 3 by the relation of Blackwell sufﬁ-
ciency and the mean preserving spread criterion.
Although more information systems will be comparable by the mean preserving
spread criterion, Blackwell sufﬁciency is useful for at least two reasons. First, it is a
global criterion which does not focus on a particular effort level ˆ a. Therefore, infor-
mation systems can be compared by it without specifying which action is sought to be
induced. Second, and for the application even more important, the criterion refers to
the signal distributions instead of the distributions of likelihood ratios. Usually, this
will make its use much easier. In the following subsection, we apply Corollary 1 to
rank different types of relative performance payment.
4.3 Application
4.3.1 Alternative forms of relative performance evaluation
Perhaps the most important property of tournament contracts is the fact that the total
compensation paid to all n agents is constant. Malcomson [16] uses this property to
propose tournaments as a general device to overcome the unveriﬁability problem, i.e.
tournaments can be used for compensation even if the applied performance measures
are not veriﬁable and the principal could misreport these measures in order to cut
wages. Yet, this is impossible under a tournament contract as long as contracts and
payments are observable.
12Tournaments, however, are not the only compensation form to fulﬁl the desired
propertyofaconstanttotalwagepayment. Inparticular, Japaneseﬁrmsmakeextensive
use of a special kind of relative performance payment in which a constant bonus W is
distributed to workers of a group according to their relative outputs. Agent i’s wage in







Due to its similarity to a tournament, this type of compensation has also been referred
to as a J-Type tournament after to its Japanese origin as opposed to U-Type tourna-
ments of the form described in section 2, which are predominantly applied in the US
(Kräkel [14]).
With regard to the general question of compensation cost analyzed here, the two
types of compensation contracts can be compared by application of the criteria derived
in the previous section:
Proposition 4 In the symmetric equilibrium ˆ a of the tournament game, total compen-
sation cost in a U-type tournament is lower than that in a J-type tournament.
Proof The proof is in the appendix.
The proof of proposition 4 makes use of the fact that the bonus portion in (15) is
identical to a contest success function. This contest success function, in turn, is known
in a two-player contest to be identical to the winning probability under exponentially
distributed outputs (see Hirshleifer and Riley [10], p. 380n.). The proof generalizes
this property by assuming an n-player tournament and shows that risk-neutral agents
assess a J-Type tournament equal to a U-Type tournament with an additional random-
ization. This randomization, however, weakens the incentives of the contest, leading
to a higher compensation cost.
134.3.2 Contest design
Moldovanu and Sela [19] analyze (amongst others) the question of whether a contest
should be split into several sub-contests in a situation of private pre-decision informa-
tion. They prove that for linear or convex cost functions, the grand contest generates
a higher expected output than any contest divided into subgroups of equal size (ibid.,
Theorem 1). Adapting this question to the present moral hazard situation, we ﬁnd the
following result:
Proposition 5 Total compensation cost to induce a certain action ˆ a in a symmetric
equilibrium of risk neutral contestants is lower under a grand contest of n agents than
under any split contest of subgroups with n1 ∈ {2,...n−2} and n2 = n−n1 agents.

















n:n] for ni < n, average compensation cost is higher in each
subgroup, from which the claim follows by the fact that n1+n2 = n. 2
The result is derived from the fact that the average cost (16) is decreasing in the
number of contestants11. Due to the agent’s risk neutrality, the fact that each agent’s
probability of winning decreases does not result in an additional cost. Due to the
MLRP, however, compensation reacts most sensitively to changes in the agents’ effort
if they compete in a grand contest.
11This is in line with proposition 2 in Moldovanu and Sela [19].
145 Risk averse agents
5.1 Optimal reward structure
If the competing agents are risk averse, the proposed extreme prize schedule in which
only the best performing agent receives an extra payment will no longer be optimal.
This can be illustrated by the following counterexample:
Example Consider a group of n = 3 risk-averse agents competing in a contest
with prize structure w=(w1,w2,w3). Prizes are allocated according to signals yi ∈R+
which follow the same family of probability distributions described by cumulative dis-
tribution functions G(yi |ai)=1−exp(yi/ai). Thus, the agent’s performance measures
are exponentially distributed with mean ai. Furthermore, let the agents’ preferences be
described by identical utility functions Ui(wi,ai) =
√
wi−a2
i , and let their reservation
utilities beUR = 0. Prizes have to be nonnegative. Assuming a symmetric equilibrium
of the contest game, the principal wants to implement an equilibrium effort ˆ a = 1 for


























w3 = 2 (19)
wj ≥ 0 j = 1,2,3. (20)
The coefﬁcients in (19) are the expected values of the likelihood ratio order statistics
under the exponential distribution with mean 1. The cost minimizing prize structure is
given by w1 = 0,w2 = (6/7)2 and w3 = (18/7)2. Obviously, it assigns positive prizes
to more than just the top ranking position. 2
Similar to the situation analyzed in proposition 1, the agent’s liability constraint is
15binding in the example. However, the contract proposed there would impose too much
risk on the agents. Therefore, incentives have to be provided also by w2. This is less
effective than solely rewarding the best performing agent, but under risk aversion also
less costly.
5.2 Information efﬁciency
Given the counterexample, the ranking criteria derived in the previous section cannot
directly be translated to the model with risk averse-agents because they build on the
extreme contract of proposition 1. Under a more general prize structure, the compen-






as in (14), but in general on the








= 0 for all
k, the relation of order statistics used in propositions 2 and 3 cannot hold for all ranks.
However, if the distribution function of the likelihood ratio lrl,ˆ a =
gl
a(yl;ˆ a)
gl(yl;ˆ a) under signal
yl differs from that under signal ym by a mean preserving spread, the same should hold
for the likelihood ratio distribution functions of the ranks achieved in a contest under
these measures. Intuitively, this results in prizes which are less dispersed, which in
turn yields lower compensation cost due to the agents’ risk aversion.
To prove this intuition, we ﬁrst give a condition of less dispersed prizes under
which total compensation cost is reduced (lemma 1). Subsequently, we prove that this
condition is fulﬁlled under the mean preserving spread criterion (proposition 6).
Lemma 1 Let w = (w1,...,wn) and v = (v1,...,vn) be incentive compatible prize
schedules fulﬁlling restrictions (2), (4) and (8) in the symmetric equilibrium of the
tournament. If the utility spreads resulting from that prizes under a concave utility
16function u are higher under w, then total compensation cost is less under v, i.e.










Proof The proof is in the appendix.
The lemma intuitively follows from the agents’ risk aversion and limited liability.
Under an optimal prize structure, either the agents’ participation constraint or their
liability constraint will be binding. If the participation constraint is binding under
both schedules, the higher utility spreads under schedule w produce a mean preserving
spread relation of the distribution functions of utilities. The claim then follows from
the agents’ risk aversion. If on the other hand the liability constraint is binding, the
higher utility spreads under w result in prizes which are higher for each rank. In this
case, the claim is even more obvious.
The lemma can be used to compare different information structures. For this pur-












ij(a)=Prob{ri > j−1}denotestheprobability thatagentiachievesatleast
rank j in the tournament under information system yk. Given his opponents’ effort ˆ a





(1−Gk(yk;ai))gj−1:n−1(yk; ˆ a)dyk. (24)

















17This expression can be used to prove that the mean preserving spread criterion
also applies to the setting with risk averse agents. For this purpose, we make use of
a recent ﬁnding by Demougin and Fluet [5] who prove that Kim’s mean preserving
spread criterion is equivalent to their so-called integral condition, which is deﬁned for
the transformed signals zl = Gl(yl; ˆ a) and zm = Gm(ym; ˆ a). Due to the assumption of
non-moving supports, zk is as informative as yk since Gk is strictly monotonic and an
optimal contract can be based on zk as well as on yk. Denote by Hl(zl,a) and Hm(zm,a)
the cumulative distribution functions of that signals, given a. The integral condition is
fulﬁlled if
−Hl
a(z | ˆ a) ≥ −Hm
a (z | ˆ a) ∀z ∈ [0,1] (26)
and is identical to the fact that the distribution function of lrl,ˆ a differs from that of
lrm,ˆ a by a mean preserving spread (see [5], proposition 3). The main advantage of the
criterion is that in contrast to the mean preserving spread relation, it allows for a simple
and intuitive comparison of information structures in the standard agency setting (see
[5], proposition 1). Similarly, the criterion can be applied in the contest setting to prove
the following result:
Proposition 6 In the symmetric equilibrium ˆ a of the tournament of risk-averse agents,
total compensation cost under information system yl is lower than that under informa-
tion system ym if the distribution function of the likelihood ratio lrl,ˆ a under signal yl
differs from that under signal ym by a mean preserving spread.
Proof Let w = (w1,...,wn) denote the optimal prize structure under information





































under information system zl derived from yl and the respective prize schedule v =
(v1,...,vn), the integral condition can be applied:
Since zl and zm are values of cumulative distribution functions, they follow a uni-
form distribution on [0,1]. Thus, hl
j−1:n−1 = hm
j−1:n−1 for all j. From this, the integral
in (27) is smaller than that in (28) for each j, provided that (26) is fulﬁlled. There-
fore, there exists a prize schedule v such that (28) is fulﬁlled and u(wj)−u(wj−1) ≥
u(vj)−u(vj−1) for j = 2,...,n. The claim then follows from Lemma 1. 2
The intuition of the result is readily carried forward from the arguments in Demou-
gin and Fluet [5]. Relating the integral condition to their previous ﬁndings on bonus
type contracts in the risk-neutral agency (see Demougin and Fluet [4]), they argue that
under risk aversion, a signal is preferred in an optimal contract if it is also preferred
under any bonus contract (see Demougin and Fluet [5], 490). The latter is obviously
fulﬁlled under the integral condition.
We also make use of this fact and show that if a signal is preferred under any
bonus contract, it is also preferred in a tournament. From a single agent’s perspective,
a tournament in this regard can best be described as a series of bonus contracts with
randomized aspirationlevels. Theselevelsaregivenbytheperformances oftheagent’s
12Optimal prizes are identical under ym and zm because of the monotonicity of the distribution func-
tion.
19rivals in the tournament. If a signal is more sensitive with respect to the agent’s action
for any possible value of these levels, it is also more sensitive in expected terms.
5.3 Application
Similar to the analysis of the tournament with risk neutral agents, the information ef-
ﬁciency results can be applied to compare different types of tournaments. In doing
so, we again refer to the analysis of Moldovanu and Sela [19] of contest architecture.
Our aim is to reinforce their result on the efﬁciency of the grand contest in the moral
hazard setting analyzed here. Different to our proof in section 4, however, we cannot
simply compare functions of total compensation cost as in (14) because now the com-
pensation cost depends on the agent’s risk attitude. To derive the desired result, we
therefore at ﬁrst prove that average compensation cost is decreasing in the number of
agents (proposition 7), and then turn to the question of whether to split the contest or
not (proposition 8).
Proposition 7 Average compensation cost to induce a certain action ˆ a in a symmetric
equilibrium of risk averse agents is decreasing in the number of contestants.
Proof The proof is in the appendix.
The proof of proposition 7 makes use of the fact that the principal’s optimization
problem (1)–(4) is similar to the one of a standard single agent model in which the
agent’s performance is measured by his rank among n−1 agents choosing the equi-
librium action ˆ a. The proof shows that this signal becomes more informative in the
sense of the mean preserving spread criterion when the number n of competitors in-
creases. At ﬁrst glance, this seems counterintuitive because each of the contestants
adds noise to the performance measure. At the same time, however, the number of
ranks increases, thereby enriching the principal’s opportunities to calibrate the con-
20tract. As Malcomson [17] shows, for an inﬁnite number of competitors this results in
the equivalence of a rank order contract and a piece rate contract.
The result can directly be applied to answer the initial question:
Proposition 8 Total compensation cost to induce a certain action ˆ a in a symmetric
equilibrium of risk averse contestants is lower under a grand contest of n players than
under any split contest of subgroups with n1 ∈ {2,...n−2} and n2 = n−n1 players.
Proof Obvious because average compensation cost is higher in both sub-contests,
compared to the grand contest, which follows from proposition 7.
The reasoning behind proposition 8 is similar to the one of the preceding propo-
sition 7. Although the grand contest determines an agent’s compensation based on
the noisiest information, it dominates all other architectures because it allows for the
most precise stipulation of prizes. Since in general the tradeoff of these two effects
is not obvious, the main contribution of the two propositions is to prove that the lat-
ter effect always dominates the former. At the same time, the difference to a model
without exogenous restriction to a rank order tournament is highlighted. Without the
restriction, each agent would receive a payment which is based only on his individ-
ual performance, because outputs are assumed to be independent. Since any contract
based on yk
i can be written, any information on another agent’s output only adds noise
to the compensation. Therefore, in that sense the result contrasts Holmström’ s [11]
informativeness result.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzed whether the informativeness criteria derived for information sys-
tems in a standard agency setting of moral hazard, where the principal chooses an op-
timal contract in the second best solution, also apply to a tournament setting where the
21contract is exogenously restricted to be rank-dependent. As a main result, Kim’s [13]
mean preserving spread criterion was approved to be capable of ranking performance
measures in the symmetric equilibrium of the tournament game. As a consequence,
Blackwell sufﬁciency also applies. Although in view of these parallels transferability
seems to be obvious, it is not trivial. The key feature connecting the two settings is that
the MPS relation of likelihood ratios carries forward from the original signals to the
ranks in the contest. Only from this, the result from second best contracts also holds
in the constrained model.
Various applications of the result are possible. We used it to compare different
types of contracts. The key idea is to attribute the comparison of contracts to that
of different information systems using the same type of contract. While the present
paper focussed on the comparison of speciﬁc contracts, the procedure could also be
applied to more general questions of contract design. In particular, it may be used to
identify conditions under which tournaments are optimal agreements with regard to a
specialclassofcontracts. Onesuchclasscouldbegivenbycontractswhichdistributea
constant sum of payments among a group of agents. This class is of particular interest
with respect to unveriﬁable or subjective performance information, as mentioned in
subsection 4.3. Therefore, the furnished results may be a device to prove the optimality
of tournaments as a solution to the so-called unveriﬁability problem.
22A Proofs
Proof of proposition 1: Suppose not. Let w = (w1,...,wn) denote the respective
compensation schedule, with wj ≥ wmin for all j and wj > wmin for at least one j ∈
{1,...,n−1}. We show that this contract can be improved by one of the type described
in the proposition.
To that purpose, consider the wage structure v0 = (v1,...,vn) with






















































































n:n] for all j < n by MLRP. 2
Proof of proposition 3: Denote by Lk,ˆ a the distribution function of the likelihood
ratio lrk,ˆ a, k = l,m. If Ll,ˆ a differs from Lm,ˆ a by a mean preserving spread, it is said to
23be larger than Lm,ˆ a in the convex order, which means that
ELl,ˆ a[f] ≥ ELm,ˆ a[f]
for any convex function f : R → R, provided the expectation exists13. The same holds










of independent identically distributed random variables zi ∈ R which are distributed
according to Ll
a and Lm
a , respectively. The expectation of any convex function y:Rn →
R is higher under distribution Ml,ˆ a (This follows from Theorem 5.A.3. in Shaked &



















which establishes the proposed relation due to proposition 2. 2
Proof of proposition 4: Consider performance measures yi ∈ [−¥,0] with cumula-
tive distribution function G(yi | xi) = exp(xiyi) and probability density function g(yi |
xi) = xiexp(xiyi) parameterized by the output xi. Suppose that the signals yi are used
in a U-Type tournament of the form derived in proposition 1, and only the best per-
forming agent receives a prize. Given x = (x1,...,xn), agent i0s probability of winning
13See Shaked & Shanthikumar [22], p. 55, for a deﬁnition of convex orders, and Scarsini [23], p.










































Taking into account the stochastic nature of the outputs xj, agent j’s (ex ante) expected
















This is identical to his utility in a J-type tournament in which the shared bonus W is
equal to the winner prize wn and the base salary w0 is given by wmin. Therefore, a com-
parison of compensation cost in a U-type to that in a J-type tournament is equivalent to
a comparison of the costs in U-type tournaments under performance measures xi and
yi.
Given the previous results, however, the latter is straightforward. Since yi depends
on ai only via xi, its probability density function, given ai, can be written as
g(yi | ai) =
Z
X
g(yi | x)f(x | ai)dx.
Since the function g(yi |xi) meets the requirements of a Markov kernel, xi is Blackwell
sufﬁcient for yi. From this, the claim immediately follows by corollary 1. 2
Proof of lemma 1 The proof analyzes the possible cases regarding the agents’ lia-
bility constraints.
251. The agents’ liability constraint is not binding under v and w.
In this case, the participation constraints is binding and E[u(w)] = E[u(v)]. De-
note by Fw and Fv the cumulative distribution functions of one agent’s utilities
resulting from w and v in the symmetric equilibrium. From the relation of utility
spreads (21), it follows that
(a) u(wn) ≥ u(vn) (obvious).
(b) u(w1) ≤ u(v1) (obvious).





≤ Fv(u) ∀ u < ˆ u
≥ Fv(u) ∀ u > ˆ u,
because the jumps in the cumulative distribution functions are pij = 1/n
for each rank j.















for all U ∈ R. Therefore, Fw and Fv differ by a mean preserving spread (cf.
Rothschild and Stiglitz [21], p. 230f.), and the expectation of each convex func-
tion is lower under Fv. Since due to the agent’s risk aversion the inverse utility
function is convex, expected compensation of a single agent (and thus total com-
pensation of all agents) is lower under v.
262. The agents’ liability constraint is binding under both w and v.









3. The agents’ liability constraint is binding under w and not binding under v.
In this case, the participation constraints will be binding under v, but not nec-










4. The agents’ liability constraint is binding under v and not binding under w.
In this case, the participation constraint is binding under w and w1 ≥ v1. From
this and (21), it follows that E[u(v)] ≤ E[u(w)] =UR, a contradiction. 2
Proof of proposition 7 In the symmetric equilibrium of n risk neutral contestants,
each player’s compensation is based on his rank r
ˆ a,k




in is a mean preserving spread of that of r
ˆ a,k
i,n−1, the rank in a contest of n−1
participants. The claim then follows from Kim’s (1995) results in the standard agency
setting.






ij(ˆ a) is given by E[lr
k,ˆ a
j:n]. Yet, from a triangle rule
in order statistics (see Arnold et al., Theorem 5.3.1), expectations of order statistics








This can be exploited to construct the likelihood ratio distribution function of rk
i,n from
that of rk
i,n−1 by a sequence of mean preserving spreads sj, j = 1,...,n−1, where sj
27is deﬁned as follows:
sj =

     



















































































     



















n for j = n
are those in the contest of n agents. 2
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